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The Dynamic Capabilities View emerged from the work of several researchers, aiming to 
provide an explanation for a firm’s success in a fast-changing environment. This Thesis 
strives for the analysis of the Dynamic Capabilities literature through the real life business 
history of Priceline.com, an online travel agency founded in United States. The case shows 
that the company has a high propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make 
market oriented decisions and to change their resources base while having a medium 
propensity to make timely decisions. In addition, evidence suggests that dynamic 
capabilities were key for the Priceline.com's success within a fast-changing environment, 
giving support to the literature that defines Dynamic Capabilities as the “firm’s potential to 
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The Dynamic Capabilities View received plenty of attention among management scholars 
in recent years, especially after the Teece, Pisano and Shuen' (1997) seminal article. 
According to this article, this View is an extension of the Resource- Based Theory (Barney, 
1986, 1991), which gives an explanation of how a firm can achieve a competitive 
advantage based on their bundles of resources and capabilities. 
This intense academic attention towards the Dynamic Capabilities View stems from the 
importance of the relation between strategic choices and the environmental context 
(Thompson, 1967) and its impact on firm’s performance (Audia, Locke & Smith, 2000). 
Nowadays, the frequent occurrence of major exogenous shifts – in the so called high-
velocity (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) or hypercompetitive environments (D’Aveni, 
1994) - leads to shorter average periods of competitive advantage. Consequently, firms 
need to be able to build successive temporary advantages. This View is crucial to respond 
to the challenging question of how to build those advantages. The topic is particularly 
important for strategic management but it gains prominence in other areas such as law 
and economics too (Teece 2007). 
Despite the clear importance of the literature, the topic has suffered several criticisms 
concerning the definition of the main concept (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Winter, 2003; 
Danneels, 2008), the disconnection of the literature (Barreto, 2011) and the lack of 
empirical grounding (Williamson, 1999; Priem and Butler, 2000).  
In order to address these problems, a recent definition has emerged, based on several past 
studies (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). 
The new conceptualization defines dynamic capability as the “firm’s potential to 
systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and 
threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base” 
(Barreto, 2011) and appears as an aggregate multidimensional construct (Edwards, 2011).  
The importance of this new definition relies on the fact that it 1) captures the richness and 
the essence of a large body of work, 2) allows the operationalization of the construct and 
3) solves the commonalities paradox, assuming that the presence of some commonalities 
across firms is still compatible with the potential for competitive advantage. Finally, the 
concept is applicable within fast-changing environments. 
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Based on the Dynamic Capabilities View, this Thesis involves the construction of a 
teaching case. The case is centered on Priceline.com’s business history, which is used to 
illustrate several aspects of the literature.  
Despite the multidisciplinary coverage of the concept (Teece et al., 2007), the present 
teaching case is developed particularly for the field of strategic management. It aims to 
contribute to the consolidation of the Dynamic Capabilities View by providing empirical 
evidence, especially directed to the blossoming definition. Consequently, the new concept 
is applied to an environment characterized by a fast-changing nature as the travel industry 
is. 
Priceline.com is an online travel agency (OTA) founded in 1997, which faced the above 
mentioned dynamic environment. In summary, the company’s promising start turned into 
a disappointing performance, within a tiny period of time. However, Priceline.com was 
able to respond to constant environmental challenges with renewed strategic decisions, 
which demonstrated a large capacity of adaptation. As a consequence, their stock has 
performed very well, particularly in the last five years. The fascinating story of the 
company will be used to illustrate the difficulty to manage and cope with fast-changing 
and hypercompetitive environments, as well as to demonstrate the role of dynamic 
capabilities. 
The Thesis will be presented in five main sections. The first section encloses the literature 
review, where the dynamic capabilities theoretical framework is summarized. In the 
second section I will develop the teaching case about Priceline.com’s history. The third 
section presents a teaching note relative to the case. The last piece is the Discussion 
section, where I will summarize the main findings from the case and explore its 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
PREDECESSORS OF THE DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES VIEW 
 
Porter’s Five Forces and the Resource-Based Theory are the two major approaches that 
have provided an explanation for the achievement of sustainable competitive advantages 
(SCAs) by a firm during recent decades. Michael Porter (1980) first introduced the Five 
Forces framework as a guideline for an industry analysis and it consists in the calibration 
of the role of suppliers, buyers, substitutes, competitors and potential entrants – the five 
distinct industry-level forces. The framework gained importance since it determined the 
actions a firm should take to gain position over the different forces. Consequently, Porter 
suggested that the industry was detrimental for a firm’s achievement of SCAs. 
According to Porter, SCAs are based on an exogenous market structure rather than 
resulting from the product (endogenously) generated by innovation and learning. 
Moreover, the author ignores various aspects of the competitive environment proven 
relevant, such as the role of path dependencies, complementarities and supporting 
institutions. Besides, the framework assumes that the nature of the environment is 
relatively static rather than dynamic. As a consequence, even though the Five Forces ’ 
framework has received massive popularity for academic and practice purposes, it 
appears of limited utility in turbulent environments (Teece, 2007). 
The second theory - the Resource-Based Theory (RBT) – focuses instead on the internal 
aspects of firms to explain SCAs, serving as a complement to the former framework 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  First introduced by Barney (1991), the RBT proposes that 
the creation of distinctive competencies in an industry derives from the specific bundle of 
resources and capabilities the firm has. Resources (which also comprise capabilities) are 
physical, human and organizational assets that can be used to execute value-creating 
strategies (Barney, 1986; Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995), being heterogeneously distributed 
across firms. Creating and sustaining value implies that resources verify the so called VRIN 
criteria – resources must be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, (Barney, 
1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996, Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995).  
VRIN matches the four conditions of the RBT, which are: resource heterogeneity, ex-post 
limits to competition, imperfect factor mobility and ex-ante limits to competition. One 
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important factor causing limitation to competition is causal ambiguity (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 1982) that consists in the uncertainty regarding the causes of efficiency 
differences among firms. Causal ambiguity avoids imitation because the development of a 
product/service involves sunk costs, especially R&D costs, which should be pondered 
under uncertainty. The imperfect factor mobility furthermore explains the difficulty on 
imitation since assets contain entrepreneurial and social complexity. They are also 
characterized by path dependencies, which exist since the new production function is 
derived from a known bundle of current production functions.  
Across time, supplementary conditions have been added to value sustainability since the 
mere ownership of resources, even with all of these attributes, is perceived as non 
satisfactory. In fact, firms holding similar resources and within similar environmental 
contingencies will produce different outcomes (Zott, 2003) due to different choices of 
structuring, bundling and leveraging resources (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). These 
different activities compose a firm’s management of resources, which is approached 
differently by other authors, being defined as the accumulation, combination and 
exploitation of resources (Grant, 1991; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) or their evaluation, 
manipulation and appropriate deployment (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003). Nevertheless, they 
all take into consideration the firm’s environmental context.  For a deep understanding 
about the linkage between the management of resources and the creation of value, it is 
necessary to access the effects of a firm’s environmental impact on managing resources 
(Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). 
However, RBT also presents a boundary condition since it has not adequately explained 
the achievement of competitive advantages in high velocity markets. The high 
environmental uncertainty leads to the difficulty of sustaining a competitive advantage 
once the duration of this advantage is erratic (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Environmental 
shocks can substantially increase uncertainty (Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007) and 
uncertainty produces deficits in information, which are used to identify and understand 
cause-and-effect relationships (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Keats & hit, 1988). What 
are environmental shocks? They are defined as unexpected events that create 
discontinuities in an industry (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) and can result from 
competitive actions such as the introduction of a disruptive technology (Sirmon, Hitt & 
Ireland, 2007). 
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EMERGENCE OF THE DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES VIEW 
 
From the extension of the RBT, a new subject of research emerged: the Dynamic 
Capabilities (DCs) literature (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). On the one hand, DCs literature 
is a breakthrough of Porter’s Five Forces framework once the business “ecosystem” 
replaces the industry as the environmental context (Teece, 2007), being the 
environmental context dynamic. On the other hand, it appears as a response to the 
boundary condition of RBT mentioned above once DCs are necessary to cope with 
unpredictable environments in an open globalized economy (Teece, 2007). The unstable 
and challenging environment makes firms seek series of temporary competitive 
advantages as an alternative to sustainable competitive ones (Morrow,  Sirmon, Hitt & 
Holcomb, in press), allowing them to maintain the value created in previous periods while 
creating new value (Ireland & Webb, 2006). DCs develop an important role on the 
accomplishment of these temporary competitive advantages. 
Subsequently, DCs have been a soaring subject of research and the literature about it has 
rapidly evolved, moving towards different directions. The nature of DCs itself is a non-
consensual point since they were defined as “abilities” (Teece et all, 1997), “processes” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) or even “routines” – either new routines (Zollo & Winter, 
2002) or search routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  There were discrepancies in terms 
of DC’s role as Zollo and Winter (2002) consider it as changing the operating routines of a 
firm, given that the operating routines are those which enable a firm to “make a living” and 
to solve problems; while Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) consider DC’s role as changing 
specific resources and capabilities of a firm.  
The divergence is also high regarding the context where DCs can be applied: some defend 
DCs are only relevant in fast changing environments (Teece, Pisan & Shuen, 1997), others 
defend that a moderated amount of change is enough for the significance of DCs 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and others yet defend that DCs are relevant in stable markets 
although their utility increases with a faster pace of change (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Researchers also assume different perspectives regarding the heterogeneity of DCs across 
firms. For some (Makadok, 2001; Teece et al., 1997), DCs are firm specific and exclusive, 
which can be linked with the importance of a firm’s idiosyncratic path-dependent history 
on DCs creation. For others (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), there are commonalities across 
firms in which concerns to DCs, as one dynamic capability permits different but similarly 
effective ways of performing a task. However, these authors also noticed that they are 
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constituted by idiosyncratic details beyond the common features. This second perspective 
about heterogeneity is not contradictory to the path dependency conjecture but implies 
that one specific dynamic capability can be derived from multiple paths.  
Regarding the purpose, Teece et al.’s (1997) believed that dynamic capabilities are 
decisive to address fast changing environments while Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
extended the aim from the adaptation to the market change to the effective creation of 
market change. Moreover, Zollo and Winter (2002) believe that dynamic capabilities aim 
for improved effectiveness whilst Zahra et al. (2006) believe that the purpose of DCs is the 
one desired by decision makers. Finally, since the definition of DCs constitutes a starting 
point for researches, different definitions of DCs naturally create a wide range of possible 
outcomes. As so, several researchers found a direct (Makadek, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002; 
Teece, 2007) link between DCs and performance and several others an indirect (Zott, 
2003; Zahra et al., 2006) link between the same elements. Still within the authors which 
defend the indirect link, there are different perspectives: Eisenhardt and Martin(2000) 
defend that long-term competitive advantage rely on the resources configurations, 
generated by dynamic capabilities, as well as on the approach through which dynamic 
capabilities are used and accordingly, firms with similar DCs may surpass rivals. Zott 
(2003) defend that dynamic capabilities may modify the bundle of resources and routines 
and so, influence performance and suggest that, as DCs can create different bundles of 
resources, identical DCs have differentiated performance levels. 
A NEW DEFINITION 
 
A new definition was materialized based on these previous developments, enclosing 
the ambition to solve problems associated with dissimilarities and inconsistencies of past 
researches. This new theory was suggested by Barreto (2010) and defines a dynamic 
capability as the “firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its 
propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented 
decisions, and to change its resource base” (p.271). The definition solves ambiguity, 
obscurity (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Winter, 2003; Danneels, 2008) and tautology 
(Williamson, 1999) problems, which have been pointed to by past definitions. As it 
becomes operational to seek for empirical evidence, the definition meant a crucial step for 
the achievement of a consistent DCs theoretical framework. 
According to this new definition, the purpose of DCs is clear as its nature is explicitly 
defined when the author infers that DCs “systematically solve problems”.  The word 
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“systematically” highlights a structural and persistent nature of DCs and the word 
“potential” highlights the differentiation between DCs and success and avoids the 
dichotomy of the concept, as different levels of DCs are allowed. The commonalities 
paradox is solved since there is compatibility between the presence of some 
commonalities across firms and their potential for competitive advantage. Indeed, firms 
can have commonalities in some dimensions of the construct while the others remain 
idiosyncratic. 
The new definition consists of a multidimensional construct (Edwards, 2011) because it 
comprises four different dimensions, which are related among them. Besides, it is an 
aggregate multidimensional construct as common variances or covariances shared by all 
dimensions, variances specific to any of the dimensions and covariances shared by some 
dimensions only are all taken into account (Law et al., 1998).  The four different conditions 
will be analyzed in supplementary detail:  
The propensity to sense opportunities and threats gained substance as a dynamic 
capability from previous work of different authors, like Gilbert (2006) who defends that 
framing opportunities and threats is a central part of dynamic capabilities.  
This dimension can be particularly related with the discovery view comprised on the 
opportunity formation and exploitation literature, further developed by Alvarez & Barney 
(2007). The discovery view refers to opportunities that exist independently of the focal 
actor’s efforts (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) as they arise from exogenous shocks, such 
as technological, regulatory, political, social or demographic (Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2003). 
In this situation opportunities are there “waiting to be discovered” (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007) through a main mechanism: search (Kirzner, 1997).  
Search can be either directed or undirected. Directed search implies that people know 
what they are looking for and what they should do to direct their search whereas 
undirected search involves that people are not aware of what they are looking for, so they 
do not trace a specific direction for their search (Browne et al., 2007). As so, instead of a 
directed search, entrepreneurs can use entrepreneurial alertness (Gaglio & Katz, 2001) 
which is, by Kirzner (1979, p. 48)’s words, “the ability to notice without search”. 
Teece (2007) has also attributed attention to this dimension and he stated that sensing 
opportunities involves a scanning, creation, learning and interpretive activity, normally 
complemented with investment in research and some related activities. Complementing, 
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Barreto (2012) suggested entrepreneurial interpretation as a second mechanism serving 
the discovery view. 
Regarding decision making, present in the second and the third dimensions of the 
definition, it also finds support as a dynamic capability from other researches, such as 
from Slater et al. (2006) who believe that the strategy-making process ability is a central 
dynamic capability. Moreover, Moliterno & Wiersema (2007) considered decision making, 
in which concerns to changes in the resource base, an essential element of dynamic 
capabilities. Also encouraging the link among dimensions, Rosenbloom (2000) stated that, 
without materializing the resource-changing propensity via the action of leaders, the value 
of decision making capabilities would be nil.  
 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000), which also attributed significance to the change of existing 
resources for the achievement of long-term competitive advantages, added that the change 
must be made “sooner”. Other authors (Barney, Wright & Ketchen, 2001) emphasized the 
ability to make timely decisions as a dynamic capability, which gives consistency for the 
integration of the second dimension in the definition. 
 
In further detail, Choi & Shepherd (2003) relate the exercise of entrepreneurial activities 
with the decision to exploit an opportunity, given a lead time. On one hand, these 
entrepreneurial activities, such as market research, prototype testing and stakeholders’ 
support seeking, are used to reduce the uncertainty of the market and to increase 
resources and capabilities of the firm. On the other hand, the perception of a longer lead 
time for a new product magnifies the decision to exploit the opportunity. Accordingly, 
there is a trade-off between the benefits of entrepreneurial activities and the costs of 
postponing the launch of a new product or service by developing those entrepreneurial 
activities. Making appropriate timely decisions involves properly managing this trade-off, 
which is vital for the success of the company. 
 
Beyond time, the content of managerial decisions is also key for dynamic capabilities 
(Adner & Helfat, 2003). A decisive part forming the content of these decisions is the way a 
firm provides value to customers (Priem, 2007), which is particularly enhanced by their 
market orientation (Narver & Slater, 1990). Moreover, Menguc & Auh (2006) argued that 
market orientation is a dynamic capability when in the presence of reconfigurational 
capabilities. 
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The accuracy of decisions depends on perceiving latent demand, understanding the 
structural evolution of industries and markets, including supplier and competitors’ 
response, and “probing and reprobing customer needs” (p.1322) and technological 
possibilities (Teece, 2007), among other variables. Teece (2007) additionally declares that 
the way a firm provides value to customers and converts the value delivered into profit is 
determined by the design and performance specification of the product and the business 
model employed. 
Finally, the propensity to change its resource base finds congruence with a vast body of 
past research (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997).  Altering 
the resource base comprises “acquiring, shedding, integrating and recombining resources” 
and these new configurations are achieved as “markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and 
die” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1107). 
In line with this conceptualization, Hitt et al. (2007), defend that management of resources 
comprises three phases: structuring the firm’s resource portfolio, bundling those 
resources to build capabilities and leveraging those capabilities.  The purpose of managing 
resources is to exploit opportunities, taking advantages of specific market opportunities, 
and to create and maintain value for customers and owners.  
It is important to note that not always a company has the resources needed to accomplish 
the selected strategies and when this situation occurs there is a resource gap (Teng, 2007). 
A company possess four possible ways of filling a resource gap: through internal 
development, through market transactions (Barney, 1986), – either tangible or intangible - 
through acquisitions (Park, 2002) and through strategic alliances (Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 
1999). Each one of the alternatives encompasses pro et contra factors. For instance, 
internal development can be unsuitable for a firm in terms of timing, especially in 
hypercompetitive environments that require fast responses to opportunities (D’Aveni, 
1994), adding to the fact that there is a high development cost and a high risk of failure. As 
a benefit, the firm has a total control of the resources created. Market transactions can 
have a low cost and reach high efficiency but they can lack the competitive advantage gain. 
Acquisitions can represent a high purchase price, integration difficulties, hidden risks and 
anti-trust restrictions but can also signify rapid growth (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Last but 
not the least, strategic alliances augment flexibility and speed, beyond the share of either 
costs or risks. However, they can be very difficult to manage and the access to resources 
are normally temporary (Parkhe, 1993). 
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Closing, the vast literature developed about Dynamic Capabilities across times can be 
enriched using case studies. They compose a manner of gaining supplementary evidence 
about the different dimensions forming a dynamic capability, as several researchers, such 
as Galunic & Eisenhardt (2001), Lampel & Shamsie (2003), Pablo et al. (2007) and 
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II. TEACHING CASE 
 
Founded in July 1997 in the United States by Jay S. Walker, Priceline.com is pioneer of a 
distinctive type of e-commerce, as it created the innovative “Name Your Own Price” 
demand collection system, and leader in global online hotel reservations. The Group is 
composed of five primary brands, being an important provider of several online travel 
services, such as airline tickets, hotel room reservations, rental cars, cruises and vacations 
packages, in over 180 countries.  In the early days though, the company dealt with 
successive obstacles and profits seemed difficult to achieve. Was Priceline.com able to 
adapt to successive shocks affecting the travel industry and strong enough to compete 
against their robust competitors? What was Priceline.com’s strategy and what were the 
results from their strategic orientation? Could Priceline.com guarantee a sustainable 
growth in the future? 
 
HOPE FOR THE BEST… 
 
When the American Jay S. Walker launched Priceline.com’s online service on 6th April 
1998, he was revolutionizing the travel service market. For the first time, consumers were 
able to electronically bid for round-trip tickets, having the possibility to offer a price for an 
airline ticket, below the lowest available fare in the market.1 
At Priceline.com launched time, online auctions were not novel, either for individuals or 
businesses. However, Priceline.com became pioneer and patent owner of a reverse type of 
auction, also called blind auction, when they created the “Name Your Own Price” (NYOP) 
model, first applied to the airline industry. 2 3  
With the NYOP system, Priceline.com acted as the middle man between airline customers 
and airline companies. The firm had access to an unpublished inventory of ticket fares 
made available by American and International airlines and through it, they could issue a 
ticket once an airline carrier had met the price proposed by the traveler on the company’s 
website. Additionally to the price, consumers listed their destination, travel dates and 
provided a credit card to be charged.4 5 
Consumers were not completely aware of what they were buying a priori (they were 
buying opaque products). Although they could choose price, destination and dates, they 
should be willing to accept a set of conditions: the airline company, the schedule – which 
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could vary from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. – and the possibility of one stop or connection. Moreover, 
most tickets were not refundable or changeable, customers did not earn recurrent flier-
miles and although their first request, which could be up to eight tickets, was free of any 
additional charge, every subsequent request for the same itinerary and dates was charged 
$25.6 7 
Customers’ main advantage was to obtain lower prices. In fact, they faced a trade-off 
between price and flexibility with respect to brands, sellers and product features. Airline 
companies also benefited from the model as they could sell last-minute tickets privately, 
through e-mail lists - opposing to the traditional price-disclosed model. The new method 
enabled them to clear out inventory that would have their value vanished, by the use of a 
non-disruptive distribution channel which generated incremental revenues for them.8  In 
other words, they could reach a huge amount of potential customers and fill hundreds of 
seats that went empty every day (in a total amount estimated in 600 000 at the time) with 
lower and unique fares offered to a niche market. At the same time, they could avoid 
cannibalization from customers who would be willing to pay higher fares. 9 The way 
airlines liquidated excess seats would not be publicly disclosed. In the beginning, only 
T.W.A. and America West, among the largest U.S. airlines, accepted to work with 
Priceline.com but soon they were followed by Delta, Northwest and Continental.10 
Priceline.com generated revenues by earning the differential between the price an 
individual was willing to pay and the price charged by the service company – it was a 
merchant model. Additionally, Priceline.com received reservation booking fees, customer 
processing fees and (in some cases) ancillary fees, on each flight.11 
Jay Walker’s confidence regarding the performance of the company was high, since he 
anticipated the sale of 1000 to 3000 tickets a day by the end of the year. Some criticisms 
on the system emerged though, like from the chief executive of one of the leading online 
travel agencies (OTAs), Preview Travel. He claimed that the mainstream customer would 
rather pay more for a nonstop flight on a major airline than change planes and use a 
second-tier carrier. Adding to the fact, he argued, there was a lack of surplus seats since 
operating capacity of airlines were at its highest point in years.12 
Richard S. Braddock, former president of Citicorp and current chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Priceline.com, since July, 1998, had a different opinion. In fact, 
throughout that year and the following one, he also tried to replicate the model to other 
markets, such as to hotel rooms, new car sales, car rental businesses, financial market 
services and, indirectly, to groceries and gas.13 
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On the one hand, some characteristics of the model were applied transversally to all 
products and services offered by Priceline.com, particularly, its core feature which 
consisted on the customers’ possibility to set the product or service price. On the other 
hand, some other features and processes were market specific: in case of a hotel room, 
consumers decided on its geographic area and category (star-rating or resort), in case of a 
car rental, customers decided on local and kind of car.  
Regarding the financial market, where Priceline.com operated through partnerships made 
with Lending Tree and Alliance Partners, L.P., borrowers became able to submit a 
particular request for interest rates and other terms for mortgages of a specified term, 
which included purchase money mortgages, refinancings and home equity loan services. 
Along with the request for the financial service, consumers had to deposit $200 
guaranteed by a major credit card. Regarding the purchase (or leasing) of a car, customers 
identified the exact vehicle to be purchased or leased, which included the brand, model 
and specified options and the transaction process would be closed directly between the 
customer and the car supplier. An additional feature created for financial services and car 
sales was the supplier’s possibility to counteroffer, as these products had a smaller level of 
substitutability.14 
Finally, the company licensed its patented NYOP business model, affiliated trademarks and 
software systems to Priceline’s WebHouse Club, Inc.  The WebHouse Club operated in the 
groceries and gas market since November 1999, but major differences appeared when 
applying the model to these industries: if a seat on the plane was not sold, its value was 
lost, which contrasted with the non-perishable nature of gas and some groceries; 
moreover, the cost of adding a customer to the airplane was negligible while the unit costs 
of producing, shipping and storing both groceries and gas was not. Furthermore, suppliers 
were not satisfied about selling products at a lower price without benefiting from 
customers’ brand loyalty like coupons do15.  
Two years later, the portfolio of services also counted with long distance phone calls, 
cruises (which operated under the traditional model) and the vacation package product. 
The first service allowed consumers to name a price for domestic and international calls 
from their home phones while vacation packages consisted in the combination of airfares 
and hotel or resorts room nights. 16 17 18 19 
From the very beginning, marketing campaigns constituted a golden egg for Priceline.com. 
William Shatner, which was especially known for his work as Capitan Kirk in Star Trek, 
was the person chosen to be the face of Priceline.com. The actor accepted to participate in 
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Priceline.com’s commercials in exchange for a very modest salary and stock in the 
company. Soon, the stock ended up becoming a very profitable deal for him. 20 
Besides the business model replication, during 1999, Priceline.com progressed in different 
fields. First, the company materialized the expansion of the business to Asia, through a 
partnership with Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. (Hong Kong), resulting in a new company that 
offered airline tickets and hotel rooms services, though credit cards and long-distance 
phone cards have been added later. The company was formed by a mutual investment of 
$10 million, used Priceline’s NYOP bidding system and was managed by Hutchison.21 22 23  
Second, Priceline.com restructured its warrant agreements with airline companies and, 
more importantly, enlarged their portfolio of carriers, as No. 1 United Airlines, No. 2 
American Airlines and No. 6 US Airways signed up with them.  Subsequently, its working 
partners included eight out of the nine largest United States airlines and other 20 foreign 
lines. This portfolio enlargement raised expectations of an endorsement in the company’s 
current success. 24 
 
… BUT PREPARE FOR THE WORST 
 
In September 1999 though, the NYOP business model started to be used by the second 
biggest travel agency at the time, Microsoft’s subsidiary Expedia.com, through a very 
similar service. Competition was not a surprise for Priceline.com, but the NYOP model was 
patented and soon the company filed for a lawsuit in U.S. District court against Microsoft 
and its Expedia Inc. travel subsidiary.25 26 Despite patent infringement, Microsoft had no 
intention to discontinue its service and the process resulted in the payment of royalties to 
Priceline.com.27 28 
Opposite to the conflict with Expedia, Priceline.com and the giant Travelocity announced a 
broad-based marketing alliance that offered travelers access to both companies' airline 
ticket services regardless the website they visited.  If they preferred specific airlines and 
flight times, they could access Travelocity.com’s services and if they preferred a lower fare 
in exchange for their flexibility regarding flight times and airlines, they could access 
Priceline.com’s. Each time Priceline.com facilitated the sale of Travelocity’s product, 
Priceline.com generated incremental revenues. The opposite was also true, benefiting both 
companies from larger total customer base and brand awareness. 29 
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In the end of 1999, management believed it had been a successful year as ticket sale units 
had increased from 5,000 a week in the beginning of the year to 50,000 a week at that 
moment.30 Revenues had risen from $35 million, in 1998, to $ 482 million, in 1999 and 
gross margin had benefited from a positive impact deriving from new products that 
generated fee-based and ancillary revenues. However, the company was still unprofitable, 
observing only a trivial net loss decrease from $12.7 million to $10 million during the 
same period.31 32 
Additionally, Priceline.com became a public company in Nasdaq Stock Market on 29th 
March, 199933 and, as several other companies born during the dot-com bubble, they saw 
its market value suffer huge oscillations. 
An economic bubble occurs when the price of an asset exchanged in a well established 
market “rises far higher than can be explained by its characteristics, such as the income 
likely to derive from holding the asset”.34 The internet speculative bubble occurred in the 
late 1990’s stimulated by internet- and internet related-based companies, the so called 
dot-com companies35. From 1996 to 2000, the Nasdaq Stock Index boomed from 600 to 
5,000 points36, peaking at 5,048 points in March 2000.37 During the dot-com bubble 
period, massive market overconfidence on technological advancements and subsequent 
future profits boosted investment, resulting in a rapid increase in stock prices and ensuing 
huge capital raisings for dot-com companies, despite the lack of profits or even revenues 
by firms.  In fact, supporters of the dot-com theory believed that the expansion of the 
company’s customer base with disregard for potential annual losses, illustrated by the 
phrase “get large or get lost”, was an imperative condition for the survival of an internet-
based company.38  Stock shifts turned company founders into owners of enormous 
fortunes and markets made very appealing that people quitted their job in order to 
become a full-time day trader.39 40 41 The phenomenon was so vast that, in 1999, there 
were 457 IPOs, having 117 from those doubled their price in the first day of trading. This 
can be contrasted with the 76 IPOs occurred in 2001, none of them having doubled its 
price.42   
At the IPO, Priceline.com offered 10 million shares – a 7% stake - at an initial price of $16, 
which was already above its original range of $7 to $9 per share. Benefiting from the 
investors’ period of overexcitement, the initial price boomed 437.5% in the same day, 
closing at $69. This turned Priceline.com’s initial market value of $2.28 billion into $9.82 
billion at the end of the day and converted Jay Walker into a billionaire with its $62.5 
million share stake valued at $ 5.2 billion.43 Priceline.com and the dot-com bubble in 
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general continued booming throughout the year and, during the second quarter, the 
company’s stock achieved its highest price, peaking at $162.375. This meant that 
Priceline.com shares were 10 times more valuable than initially within a time range of 
only a few months.44  
The IPO aimed to raise funds for working capital and general corporate purposes and to 
finance anticipated operating losses, the advertising campaign and brand name 
promotional expenses, among other expenditures. Moreover, the purpose of funds 
comprised potential acquisitions or investments in businesses, technologies, products or 
services that might arise.45  
By early 2000 the NASDAQ Index shrank as investors started perceiving the speculation 
created, reaching soon 2,000 points and bringing up to bankruptcy several of the early 
successful dot-com companies, many never having made a profit. 46 
As for gains, Priceline.com was not an exception concerning losses: its stock price shrank 
from its peak of $162.375, during 1999, to $46.75 in the beginning of 2000. Indeed, 2000 
was one of the toughest years in their history. First, the company’s market price continued 
to decline from day to day; second, some negative news in regards to Priceline.com’s 
customer service emerged; 47 third, not receiving the expected collaboration of suppliers, 
Webhouse Club subsidized customers’ purchases as a way to lower prices and thus 
enlarge their customer base. Managers believed that a larger customer base would 
motivate manufacturers to collaborate with reductions in prices. However, the outcome 
was significant losses, a $363 million cash burn in about one year and the shutdown of 
Priceline.com’s WebHouse Club Inc.48 49 50 In the end of this year, and given that the failure 
was particularly attributed to Jay Walker, the founder decided to leave the board of 
Priceline.com in order to rebuild his business incubator, Walker Digital Corp. 51  52 Closing 
the WebHouse Club resulted in an additional expense of $189 million due to its warrant 
write-off. Panic to sell stock was launched as well as a post-bubble economic recession, 
which made the Index sank to 800 points still in 2000.53 
Despite those bad news, Priceline.com was improving its financial performance over the 
previous year. During the year, the company added 5.5 million new customers and 4.3 
million offers from repeated customers, which made revenues more than doubled, 
summing up $1,217 million and meaning a rise of 153% over 1999.54 About 98.5% of 
those revenues derived from travel businesses as a result of the refocus by the 
management on the travel industry. Gross profits increased to $ 192.29 million, 77% of 
those being used as sales and marketing expenses, which were a priority to Priceline.com. 
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These expenses comprised television, radio, on-line and print campaigns as well as agency 
fees and production costs for television and radio. The net loss was reduced from $1,063 
million, reached in 1999, to $329.5 million. In the end, financial results were not sufficient 
to satisfy investors and the stock price fell to a minimum $1.125 in the last quarter.55 
At this point in time, Priceline.com was amongst top 5 online travel players, holding a 10% 
share in the market. The unambiguous leader was Travelocity (19% market share), which 
was an online travel brand and one of the pioneers of the web-based travel 
disintermediation. The second place was held by Expedia (14%), which was also an online 
travel brand created by Microsoft, in 1996, but that belonged to TicketMaster, at that time. 
Southwest Airlines (13%) was the third biggest online travel player, consisting in a major 
U.S. airline company operating as a low-cost carrier. Priceline was the fourth largest 
player, followed by Delta (6%), another major United States airline. The five largest 
players accounted for 62% of the U.S. online travel market.56 Even though the importance 
of agencies, suppliers (such as airlines) still dominated the market, weighting 53% of its 
value.57 
The vulnerability of the industry to external shocks and the intense competition were 
nonetheless a constant challenge for travel industry players. Additional to the market 
crash, the U.S travel industry was vastly affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Centre, in 2001. Actually, both events explained gross part of the $5 trillion market 
value loss of the NASDAQ Index, from 2000 to 2002.58 In particular, Priceline.com achieved 
new unenthusiastic records when their shares value shortened to $1.10, during the fourth 
quarter of 2001. Adding to the collapse on stock value of the firm, Priceline.com suffered a 
decrease in the adoption of the NYOP business model for airline tickets, explained by the 
weakened demand for air travel and subsequent airline companies’ downsize59 and price 
discounting reactions. Actually, 2000’s brought vast difficulties to airlines resulting in four 
major airlines filing for bankruptcy, and only American and Continental, among U.S. major 
airlines, were able to escape.60 On the one hand, the airline service downsize meant a 
lower amount of empty seats to be sold, which affected Priceline.com’s opportunity to 
bargain last minute tickets. On the other hand, lower prices offered by airline companies 
made Priceline.com’s discounted prices hard to succeed.61 As a result, the company faced a 
36% and 39% decrease in airline tickets unit sales, in 2002 and in 2003, respectively.62  
Even though the overall U.S. travel market was decreasing by 8% in 2001 and by 4% in 
2002, consumers’ habits were changing as the amount of online customers continued to 
grow over the amount of offline customers, resulting that the U.S. online travel market 
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duplicated in 2002, compared to 2000.  The market was also changing in structure, 
suffering a shift in sales from suppliers to agents. In fact, during this period, suppliers lost 
7% of the total market share to agents. Agents especially dominated sales in the hotel 
room segment where they totalized 61% of the revenues.  
Nevertheless, the scenario was not bright to all agents, especially for the leader, 
Travelocity, and for Priceline.com. The first lost its leadership position to Expedia, holding 
only 12% of the market while the new leader changed its market share to 18%. With a 
mere 4% market share, Priceline.com lost its position among the online travel market top 
5, being surpassed by a new player named Orbitz, Delta, TNI (Cendant Retail) and 
Marriot.com. Additionally, Hotels.com and especially Hotwire.com were gaining online 
travel market share and each represented already 3% of the pie. The first was a hotel 
booking provider while the second was a discount travel website. Orbitz, the fourth largest 
player in 2002, was created from a partnership of five of the six major U.S. airlines. 63  Its 
foundation explains, in part, the shift occurred in the industry from suppliers to agents. 
Worldwide, the travel industry suffered a particular negative impact, in 2003, also 
associated with epidemic diseases such as SARS and the military actions against Iraq. 64 
The financial turbulence over the company was accompanied by instability within 
Priceline.com’s management, resulting in CEO’s position change for four times within a 
time frame of only two years. In May 2000, Braddock was fired from his CEO role to be 
replaced by Daniel Shulman one month later, even though Braddock maintained his 
chairman position.65 However, his role as CEO ended up being a short time position 
since he was replaced one year later by his predecessor Richard Braddock, still holding 
the chairman position. Yet again, the charge was not held for a long time and by 2002, 
Jeffery Boyd was elected CEO.  
The new CEO had been Priceline.com Chief Operating Officer since 2000, after his role of 
executive vice president and general counsel.66 Right before joining Priceline.com, he 
had been HMO Oxford Health Plans Inc. executive vice president, general counsel and 
secretary.67 
 
WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH, THE TOUGH GET GOING… 
 
Boyd stepped on a dangerous ground – in 2002, Priceline.com’s stock price fall was huge, 
net loss was more than the double compared to the previous year and almost 20% of the 
company’s staff had been fired68 – nevertheless he had the courage to take risky and 
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controversial decisions from the very beginning. Boyd completely transformed 
Priceline.com’s strategy, starting with the shutdown of the non-travel businesses. As a 
response to the decline of the airline tickets market, the new CEO decided to transform 
hotel booking services into the core business of the Group. Moreover, they started using 
the traditional price disclosed model as their major distribution model, which meant to 
dismiss the enthusiasm over their masterpiece, the NYOP model.   
Contrary to airline tickets, hotels reservations had an increase of 39% in revenues in 2003 
over 2002 and Boyd decided to take advantage of this growth. First, Priceline.com invested 
in and formulated an agreement with Travelweb LLC, a hotel distribution network that 
belonged to five major hotel companies, among other investors. Second, the company 
launched an aggressive campaign specified for this industry.69  
Changing the core business from airline tickets to hotel reservations was also a 
controversial decision, since NYOP airline bookings accounted for 80% of Priceline.com’s 
revenues, in 2002. The price disclosed model (which was the traditional way under which 
travel agencies operated), launched in the fourth quarter of 2003, was already available 
via Priceline.com’s subsidiary Lowestfare.com during the prior year. However, disclosed 
prices were only presented to customers that had been unsuccessful when using the NYOP 
model. Just in 2003 the agency model was universally applied on airline tickets, hotel 
rooms and vacation packages products, due to the belief that the NYOP model only fitted 
college students’ preferences, underexploring the less flexible travelers’ market. 70 
However, the company continued offering services under the NYOP model, serving 
different types of customers in one single platform, which was Priceline.com’s website. 
The new product revenues were mainly obtained by processing fees and third-party 
supplier commissions related to the sale of travel products; and ancillary fees, which 
included global distribution system (GDS) reservation booking fees related to 
transactions.71 GDS combined with the Electronic Data Interchange Standards (EDI) 
enabled airlines and agents to offer multiple airlines services on a single system.  Since the 
nineties, the GDS market had been represented by three major international brands: 
Amadeus, Sabre and Travelport.72 
The strategic moves into the hotel industry, under an agency model, contributed to 
reverse their bookings and gross profit evolution, even though the majority of total 
revenues in that year still derived from the merchant business.73 After a promising start 
under Boyd’s command, the final result for the year of 2003 was a positive net income for 
the first time in 6 years of operations, as Priceline.com almost profited $12 million.74 
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Boyd searched for growth driven by internationalization and strategic acquisitions in the 
following years. Indeed, with these acquisitions, Priceline.com aimed to expand its 
geographical reach to underutilized areas. Rather than expanding overseas with their own 
brand, the company opted for the purchase of firms that were original from the targeted 
areas and that had proven to successfully operate and profit in those markets. As so, they 
acquired three online hotel reservation companies:  Active Hotels (2004) and 
Booking.com (2005), in Europe, and Agoda.com (2007), in the Asia-Pacific region75.   
The number of Priceline.com possible acquisition targets was large. Nevertheless, 
Priceline.com Inc. carefully pondered their strategic acquisitions, particularly in regard to 
companies’ management style. Additionally to the importance attributed to management, 
Priceline.com found value in maintaining the independence of companies after each 
acquisition, even though that meant facing costs that could be avoided if only one 
operational platform was chosen and systems were merged. One particular exception to 
this policy was the merger between the European companies Active Hotels and 
Booking.com.76  
Europe was a very attractive market in terms of size, nature and growth.77 Regarding size, 
Europeans had twice the vacation days compared to Americans which made the market 
larger.78 In fact, international arrivals in Europe totalized 55% of total international 
arrivals, both in 2004 and in 2005. Furthermore, the recent European Union enlargement 
from 15 to 27 countries generated an increase in European Union population from about 
380 million to 485 million which, along with the Community’s accession policy and the 
market oriented policies, facilitated tourism flows and increased the importance of the 
already vast intra-European tourism79. The penetration of low cost airline companies such 
as EasyJet and Ryanar (Exhibit 1) were increasing the attractiveness for weekend leisure 
travels and consequential hotel room spending80. The majority of European tourists 
travelled via land and not air, though, which still holds true today (Exhibit 2).81  
Regarding nature, one most important and advantageous characteristic of the European 
market was its fragmented hotel industry structure. There were fewer big hotel chains 
than in North America, which increased demand for independent hotels. These hotels 
often lacked their own website and so, they could benefit from the Priceline.com’s service 
as the company could give them access to a larger range of potential customers.82   
Finally, the European market had more room to grow from their lower internet purchase 
rate, when comparing to Americans.83 In Europe, back in 2003, only about 15% of total 
bookings were made online: 61% of them were travel bookings and 14% hotel bookings.84  
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At the moment Priceline.com acquired the UK-based Active Hotels Ltd., the English firm 
worked with a range of 8,000 chain and independent hotels throughout Europe, from 
B&Bs to 5-star hotels. Their distribution network encompassed company-owned Web 
sites such as activereservations.com and approximately 1,500 Web sites operating 
throughout Europe, being available in 5 languages (English, French, Spanish, German and 
Italian). The Amesterdam-based Bookings B.V. had some important presence in Europe 
too, when acquired by Priceline.com. The company had been created in 1996 and beyond 
its presence across Europe, they were also present in major cities around the world. 
Similarly to Active Hotels, they were working with chain and independently owned hotels.  
The cash transaction paid to acquire Active Hotels Ltd. And Bookings B.V. was about 
US$161 million and US$ 133 million, respectively.  Revenue for the 12 months ended June 
30, 2005 was approximately US$22 million for Active Hotels, up around 115% year over 
year, and US$25 million for Booking.com, up around 100% year over year. 
 
Combining the inventory of both companies, on all of its sites, Priceline acquired a 
database of almost 18,000 European hotels. 85 One of the first steps after Booking.com 
acquisition was to smoothly integrate, under continuous monitoring, the two acquired 
companies’ business into Booking.com, which would operate under the agency model. 
ActiveHotels’ partners had to switch over to use the Booking.com extranet and to receive 
respective training. Booking.com extranet had a distinctive feature: its preview button that 
could be used by hotels in exchange for a higher commission. This button allowed hotels to 
immediately view where their properties would appear in the site search results, 
simplifying the process. 
The renewed company had an autonomous executive team, marketing budget and growth 
strategy from its parent company. The brand started receiving 12% in commissions 
instead of the 25%-30% given to the other OTAs and had to wait months to collect on 
prepaid bookings since customers booked online but only paid the hotel at checkout. 86 
Moreover, consumers did not have to pay booking or administration fees. 
Priceline.com primary objective was to become the top online hotel reservation in 
Europe.87 The goal seemed very ambitious and hard to obtain for a company that, earlier, 
was almost only operating in the U.S. The objective was particularly difficult as they faced 
such a strong competition, especially from Expedia Inc. which, since 2002, operated in 
Europe through Hotels.com and from Sabre Holdings (Travelocity’s parent) which 
operated through Lastminute.com. Although a later entrant in the European market, 
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Priceline.com chose to compete through a local company and grew much faster than its 
U.S. competitors88. Cendant also bought a European rooted company, EBookers Plc. 
Hotels.com worked with around 15,000 properties, in 2005, but soon they started 
expanding their reach maintaining their position of one of the hotel booking leaders.89 
Lastminute.com had not made a profit up to 2005 but, through the following years, they 
increased profitability while narrowing their portfolio of brands at the same time, which 
had reached a maximum of 25 brands, in Europe. They particularly grew on their hotel 
booking business and achieved a huge success with its “Top Secret Hotels” franchise, 
under the merchant model, becoming one of the leading hotel bookings players, in Europe 
too. 90  
Booking.com’s strategic plan to succeed was based on three main pillars. The first one was 
to take advantage of the fragmented European hotel reservation market and so, to focus 
on expansion amongst standalone hotels. This led to the second pillar, which was to 
improve their service by investing in their width of supply.  An outsized inventory of 
hotels would mean added value to customers as their choice in destination and category-
types would be amplified. Last but not the least, Booking.com invested huge amounts of 
money into search engine marketing. 
 
Booking.com also adopted a persuasive design on its website, through mechanisms such 
as price discounts, disclosure of number of rooms still available per hotel, number of users 
seeing each ad and time of the last hotel reservation. These mechanisms put pressure on 
interested consumers of a specific hotel that, afraid of losing the opportunity, reserve their 
hotels quickly at Booking.com, without further reservation conditions comparisons.91 
After Booking.com acquisition and expansion, revenues and net income started growing at 
an incredible pace.  In 2006, about 40.6% of the Group’s gross bookings were already 
originated from European operations and the agency business was the major source of 
gross profits, in a total of $213.9 million comparing to merchant gross profits of $ 182.16 
million. Priceline Inc., an unprofitable firm in 2003, had reached a net income of $74.5 
million during 2006.92 
 
On the other side of the globe, another challenge had begun with the acquisition of Agoda. 
Agoda was a Bangkok (and Singapore)-based online travel company specialized in hotel 
discount bookings. Their network included 7,000 hotels in Asia, above 33,000 worldwide 
and a total of $36 million in gross bookings, representing an increase of 122% over the 
previous year. The transaction consisted of an initial cash payment and a multi-year 
compensation based on performance. Following Priceline.com common practice, the 
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company maintained its management team, which would work independently from 
Priceline.com. Glenn Fogel, Priceline.com's Corporate Development and International 
Managing Director, was convinced the time was right to start growing presence in the Asia 
Pacific region, a market where internet usage, credit card adoption and domestic 
economies continued to grow.93  
 
Similarly to Booking.com, online and affiliate marketing consisted of the main instrument 
used by Agoda to generate traffic to their websites.94 In fact, a substantial part of gross 
profits of the Group was used as marketing expenses and the value kept on aggressively 
growing, following the growth trend of revenues. In 2007, they spent $172.7 million on 
online advertising expenses and $36.0 in offline advertising expenses.95 On the other hand, 
both companies had no advertising business distracting customers in their websites.96 
 
Throughout 2007, Priceline.com had created a social phenomenon in the United States 
with its most recent television Priceline Negotiator advertisement.  Shatner appeared as 
Priceline Negotiator, which was a hard-bargaining professional negotiator stopped by 
nothing to have the best deals and the highest savings for Priceline.com’s customers. For 
instance, he appeared “dispatching a lemur to find bargains and threatening a car rental 
agent with a falcon”. People re-created the karate kick popularized by the commercial and 
talked about the ad through Twitter, Facebook and Youtube, similarly to earliest 
Priceline.com commercials where William Shatner appeared. 
 
Priceline.com, in U.S., created also the campaign No Fee to emphasize the elimination of 
airline ticket booking fees. 97 Indeed, Priceline.com surprised customers by eliminating 
booking fees on published-price domestic and international airfares, taking advantage 
over competitors. 
 
Soon, Priceline.com decided to modify hotel service fees too. The company lowered its 
booking fees for published-price hotel reservations and eliminated the existing fee to 
cancel or change a published-price hotel reservation, when almost all other major online 
hotel reservation services continued to charge about $25 in change/cancel fees for certain 
reservations.98 Over 16 months, the company devoured Expedia’s market share and 
Expedia dropped in its gross bookings by 11.1% to $4.0 billion while Priceline.com 
increased theirs by 22.9% to $1.5 billion.99 
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Even though reluctant, Expedia, Orbitz and Travelocity ended up cutting their fees in 
airline bookings as part of promotions that extended through May 2009. Expedia and 
Orbitz also cut hotel booking fees temporarily, in a moment where booking fees accounted 
for 6% to 8% of Expedia revenues and 10% for Orbitz’s.100    
Cutting fees did not impede Priceline.com of continuously improving their business. On 
the contrary, the company signed several participation agreements and extensions with 
major airlines, such with Jet Blue that gave full access to its published fares, schedules and 
inventories. Additionally, Priceline.com started combining their traveler reviews with new 
exclusive Zagat Survey reviews and information for hotels, restaurants and attractions, 
covering over 600 cities.  
As for 2007, Priceline.com achieved good results again. They increased their revenues in 
25.5% over the previous year and net income raised 14.5% to $155.5 million over the 
same period. The boom was particularly due to international services since, 
internationally, gross bookings increased 113.0% during the fourth quarter, over the 
previous year. However, even the domestic growth rate was driving above average, as it 
reached 24.2%. Additionally, the company could surpass rivals’ market capitalization for 
the first time (Exhibit 3), as the pace of growth achieved by Priceline.com’s stock was 
much faster than the one achieved by Expedia’s.101 
 
KITES RISE HIGHEST AGAINST THE WIND, NOT WITH IT 
 
Jeffery H. Boyd believed that they were achieving sustainable growth internationally due 
to their wide geographic reach, new market initiatives and extensive inventory. In the end 
of 2007, the proposed goal had been achieved: only three years after their expansion to 
the continent, Priceline had become the online hotel reservation leader in Europe. The 
next goal was even more ambitious: the company yearned to become the worldwide 
online hotel reservation leader.102 
 
As the global online market continued to gain importance in the travel industry, customers 
had lower search costs and an easier accessibility to information. As a result, price-based 
competition was more intense for equal quality standards. These aspects contributed for 
the already competitive travel agency industry, which had low barriers to entry. 
Nevertheless, even before analyzing price possibilities, destinations were the consumers’ 
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primary decision.103 Therefore, agencies benefited if they had a larger breadth of 
destination options. 104 
Besides internet mechanisms, consumers’ consciousness to price was augmented by the 
economic crisis that began in the United States during 2008 and that had been especially 
extended to Europe. In fact, Europe consisted in the most affected continent as 
international tourist arrivals decreased about 2% between 2006 and 2009 (Exhibit 4)105 
Adding to one of the most severe periods the industry has ever lived (Exhibit 5), the world 
witnessed an additional shock on demand as the H1N1 influenza A virus started spreading 
around the world. Hotel occupancy rates and average daily rates decreased in 2008 with a 
special impact on demand for luxury accommodation, as well as long range destinations. 
However, short range destinations even rose above average. Business trips have seen their 
length and terms reduced, being often transformed into video and telephone conferences 
as a cost-cutting alternative to travels. With a decrease in demand and consequential cuts 
in tour operators' commissions and overall supply, travel agencies’ activity was limited 
and in the first quarter of 2009, the decline in revenues cumulated 10%, globally, when 
compared to the same period of the previous year.106 Despite the global economic 
conditions (Exhibit 6), and overall travel demand (Exhibit 7, 8 and 9), Priceline.com gross 
travel bookings increased more than 50% over 2007, totaling $ 1.9 billion in revenue.107 
Not even, the “unprecedented economic turbulence”, as Boyd stated, could stop 
Priceline.com performance. Although Priceline.com’s stock capitalization fell in 2008, the 
fall was softer than Expedia’s,108 and one year later, in 2009, the net income of the Group 
increased about 211.6% comparing to 2007, as the company reached $489,472 million in 
profits. The stock capitalization followed net income growth and Priceline.com was valued 
in about $ 9.96 billion, twice as much their value in 2007. 
The financial results were, in great part, a consequence of the growth of the acquired 
companies. One year after the acquisition of Agoda, the company’s organic gross bookings 
had grown by more than 100%.109 At the same time, Booking.com, under Kees Kolen 
leadership, continued strengthening its position as the largest and fastest-growing online 
hotel reservations service in Europe. Booking.com’s supplier base increased by 47% year-
over-year and their services were then spread over 60,000 properties and 70 countries, 
being accessible in 21 different languages.110 By this time, the company benefited from a 
partnership with the biggest European low cost carrier: hotel booking services appearing 
on Ryanair’s website were provided by Booking.com.111   
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Mr. Glenn D. Fogel, the Head of Priceline.com Worldwide Strategy and Planning, was 
confident about the company’s vigor and he argued that “due to our size and flexibility, we 
are better positioned than many to adapt as the market changes”. 112 
 
Indeed, there was no shortage of market change. Regarding technology, the adoption of 
mobile devices was growing worldwide and internet traffic was changing from computers 
to tablets and smartphone devices. This growing importance attributed to mobiles started 
producing a shift in power from search engines to smartphone manufacturers and 
developers, also leveraged by geolocalization services based on GPS technology.113  
 
Attentive to consumers’ movements, Priceline.com launched new mobile services for 
travelers, which were especially important for last-minute customers. Results were good: 
Booking.com’s mobile apps were downloaded more than 20 million times from 2010 to 
2012. This summed up around $3 billion in mobile travel reservations only in 2012, triple 
that of one year ago, which reflected the fast adoption of smartphones from European 
users. 114 
 
Priceline.com was also aware and responsive to other changes in the industry, such as 
demand growth tendencies. Priceline.com continued investing in new and fast-growing 
markets like Asia-Pacific and South America, where there was a rapid online adoption. 
Agoda started teaming with Asia-Pacific airlines, like Air China and Jetstar Airways, in 
order to extend their hotel businesses in the Asia Pacific region. Expedia, on the other 
hand, built a joint venture with Air Asia. 115 If analyzing the Chinese online travel agency 
market, Ctrip was the clear leader, far ahead from the second player, eLong, which 
belonged to Expedia. Agoda was distant from the top, being surpassed by many other 
travel agencies in the country, in regards to market share (Exhibit 10).  
At the same time, the Group sustained its growth in Western Europe and North America. 
Besides the Priceline.com brand, Booking.com started growing in the United States market 
too and so, competing with their parent although they owned a different positioning. 
While Booking.com was a hotel reservation leader, Priceline.com was positioned as a 
discount-travel leader.116 
During this time, Booking.com had been a growth driver for Priceline.com under Kees 
Koolen role as CEO, representing about 61% of its bookings and 75% of its consolidated 
operating income. 117 Kees Koolen was one of the founders of Booking.com B.V. and 
assumed the role of CEO in 2008, being responsible for the rise of Booking.com into the 
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number-one hotel reservation service. However, in 2011, Koolen embraced Booking.com’s 
chairman position, being replaced by Daren Huston, a former Microsoft executive.118  
Change within the Group comprised travel segments as well, as Priceline.com reinforced 
their investment in rental cars, which was a piece in the business not very explored till the 
moment. They acquired the English multinational car hire reservation service 
TravelJigsaw Ltd. and aimed to become leaders in the segment. After the acquisition, the 
company retained the management team, who kept their minority ownership stake. 
Traveljigsaw had been established in 2004, being the fastest growing online car rental 
agency in the world with a presence in 80 countries across the globe and owner of more 
than 40,000 locations with a full range of vehicles, permitting that customers could rent 
cars and vans they were familiarized with.119 Expedia Inc. operated in the rental car 
business especially through Car Rentals.com, a smaller and less global business.120 
TravelJigsaw enhanced its rental car platform and website and started working closely 
with Booking.com and Agoda, in order to build distribution and as a part of cross-
promotion between brands.121 To improve cohesion among them, in the beginning of 
2013, Priceline.com Inc. announced the promotion of Daren Huston, CEO of Booking.com, 
to manage the international brands Booking.com, Agoda.com and Rentalcars.com, 
although all of them continued with independent leadership teams. Huston became 
responsible for inter-brand relations in terms of sale of technology, best practices, 
coordination of relationships with customers, supply and affiliates and even, when 
needed, of the development strategy regarding geographic expansion and competition 
among brands. 122 
 
From 2008 to 2011, the Group saw its net income increase about 479%, as they achieved 
profits of $1,056 million during 2011, one year after surpassing their major rivals EBITDA 
for the first time in history, (Exhibit 11) and their stock valuation reflected the success 
(Exhibit3). Even though Priceline.com still operated with its NYOP model in the United 
States, the disclosed–price model was the major source of Priceline.com’s revenues and 
the reason for Priceline.com hotel reservation worldwide leadership. Moreover, the 
international business, particularly boosted by the European market but expanding reach 
in the Asia Pacific area, weighted 78% of gross bookings and 88% of consolidated 
operating income in 2011.123  
 
Following its strategy, Priceline.com always reserved a great amount of profits for online 
advertising. In 2011, Priceline.com invested a total sum of $919.2 million in online 
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advertising. In the particular case of Booking.com, the larger hotel inventory when 
comparing with competitors and the know-how on search engine owned by the marketing 
team allowed them to leverage their set of keywords and to have better conversion 
rates.124 125 126  
 
Priceline.com Inc. was one of the major investors in Google Ad words, being first among 
the online travel agencies (OTAs). The total advertising of the Group signified about 25% 
of their revenues, in 2012, above the 22% spent by its major rival, Expedia. From those 
25%, about $1.14 billion was spent with Google, the main benefited party from online 
travel agencies advertising rivalry. 
 
However, more than a channel, Google had become a significant threat as a meta-search 
engine. In 2011, Google introduced the Hotel Finder service, an accommodation search 
service, and acquired ITA Software Inc., a provider of flight prices and itineraries. 127 
As a response to the threat, Priceline.com acquired Kayak Software Corp. for $1.8 billion, 
while Expedia bought Trivago for about $630 million, as well as the travel-search start-up 
site Room 77 Inc. Kayak was a travel meta-search engine created by cofounders of 
Expedia, Travelocity and Orbitz, in 2004, which went officially public in April, 2011. The 
engine compared airline (including hacker fares which consist on the purchase of two or 
more one-way tickets from different airlines), hotel, car rental, cruises and other vacation 
products from other travel websites. Nevertheless, by this time, online travel agencies 
were still the most important channel used by active travelers, far ahead from meta-search 
engines, while branded supplier sites continued to be the second most important 
channel.128 In terms of profits, online travel agencies also surpass meta-search firms, 
because while the first receives a flat booking fee, – around 15%, in case of Booking.com - 
the second only received per click – around 7%.129  
 
Expedia Inc. is the leader in total bookings, since they provided a total of $34 billion 
bookings throughout 2012 against Priceline.com Inc.’s $28 billion. However, 
Priceline.com Inc.’s dominates business related to the European market (Exhibit 12) and 
to hotel bookings, which is the most lucrative segment amongst travel services. In fact, 
commissions can reach 30% for some hotels whilst airlines only reach around 2%.130 This 
can justify the difference between Priceline.com’s market capitalization and competitors’. 
Actually, the Group was the best-performing stock company in the Standard & Poor's 500 
over the past five years, rising 519%.  
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The results Priceline.com has been obtaining reflect their accurate decision making. Boyd 
and Huston seem an unbeatable team, presenting incredible growth rates, despite all 
inconveniences and distresses on the way. But are they really unbeatable? And will Huston 
continue its successful path with Booking.com even diffusing attention to other 
Priceline.com Inc.’s businesses? Moreover, will Priceline.com be as successful in emerging 
countries as they were in Europe?  
 
On the other hand, Priceline.com has never lost track amongst strong competitors. 
However, can Google be transformed into Priceline.com’s reason for decline? Or will the 
power of the meta-search engine giant be only an illusion, as mobile services gain 
importance? If the Google threat materializes, will Priceline.com be able to compete 
against the giant with its recently acquired search engine, Kayak? After all, is 
Priceline.com’s market capitalization faithful to their performance and does it have margin 
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III. TEACHING NOTE 
 
Priceline.com Inc. started its online operations in 1998. They created a distinctive business 
model called “Name Your Own Price”, which consisted in a blind auction where customers 
defined the price to pay for an airline ticket in exchange for a high level of flexibility 
regarding time of the flight and airlines companies, among other limiting conditions.  
Airline companies agreed with the deal as they could continue selling their tickets through 
the traditional way while benefiting from incremental revenues for trading empty seats, 
which would have their value vanished if not occupied.  
The idea seemed very promising and Priceline.com Inc. quickly replicated the model to 
other markets. In 1999, the company was already offering airline tickets, hotel bookings, 
car rentals, car sales, financial services and, indirectly, gas and groceries.  The company 
became publicly traded in this year and benefited from all the dot-com bubble 
overexcitement towards internet-based companies, which allied with high expectations 
that investors had for the business, made the value of their stock augment ten times, in 
few months.   
Nevertheless, problems started arising and 2001 meant a terrible year in Priceline.com 
Inc.’s history. The investment on groceries and gas through the WebHouse Club was a total 
disaster, adding to the fact that Priceline.com services were receiving a bad feedback from 
customers, involving several complaints. Moreover, as true as Priceline.com had benefited 
from the dot-com bubble created, the company was also severely affected by the burst of 
the bubble and their stock suffered a sharp decline: in about one year it decreased from 
about $162 to only $1. The burst of the bubble resulted in an economic recession in U.S., 
which allied with the terrorist attack of 9/11 and some other conflicts such as the Iraq 
war, had a huge impact on the travel industry and particularly, changed the structure of 
the airline market. In fact, it was a dark period for airline companies. In order to adapt to 
changes on demand, the carriers had to reduce prices and downsize the offer.  
Those were bad news for Priceline.com business and actually, their “Name Your Own 
Price” was losing customers, affecting the company’s results, as they more than doubled 
their net deficit over the previous year, reaching a negative value of $19,184 million .  
After some successive changes in the board, Jeffery Boyd, the new CEO, took the 
responsibility to put Priceline.com back on track by making some risky and controversial 
decisions. First, he dismissed attention to the “Name Your Own Price” business model. 
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Second, he concentrated their efforts into the hotel reservation services. Third, he invested 
in internationalization, through consecutive strategic acquisitions. 
It would have been difficult that any other new CEO could have had much more success 
than Boyd. In the first whole year of Boyd as CEO, Priceline.com achieved positive results 
for the first time in five years. From that moment on, the company achieved exponential 
growth, especially through Booking.com (which resulted from a merger between two 
acquired companies, Active Hotels and Booking B.V.). Booking.com was specialized in 
hotel reservations and, across time, they achieved the leadership of the European hotel 
reservations market. Europe was a very attractive market and their hotel business 
provided vastly higher commissions to travel agencies than airline services did, which can 
justify the difference in market valuation between Priceline.com and their competitors. 
Moreover, the company expanded to Asia, through an acquisition of another company: 
Agoda, which was an Asian online agency that operated under a merchant model. Agoda 
grew also beneath Priceline.com control, although the company never reached the success 
that Booking.com did. 
Having achieved their objective of leading the hotel reservation market, Priceline.com Inc. 
delineated another objective: to grow in the car rental segment. Priceline.com acquired a 
specialized company, called TravelJigsaw and transformed it into RentalCars.com.  
Priceline.com has only seen a decrease in its profits once (in 2008) since 2003. In fact, the 
company always presented soaring results growth, reflected in their stock valuation. For 
the records, the company was the fast-growing stock in Standard & Poor's 500, rising 
519% from 2008 to 2012. The company is nowadays trying to expand their business in 
emerging markets such as in Asia and in South America and investing in their mobile 
services, which had their revenues tripled from 2011 to 2012. At the same time, 
Priceline.com is trying to fight an intimidating threat from Google with a new acquisition, 
Kayak, as the meta-search engine giant has invested in a search engine directed to the 
travel market.  
TEACHING PURPOSE:  
The present case is targeted for Business Administration students, preferably serving as a 
dynamic capabilities illustration for Strategy courses. It is suited either for undergraduate 
or Masters’ program, having as a prerequisite some knowledge on strategy, particularly, 
on Porter’s 5 Forces Analysis and the Resource Base Theory. 
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Students are required to: 
 Analyze the different elements (clients, suppliers, competitors, substitutes 
and potential entrants) comprised on the overall travel industry, with particular emphasis 
in the online travel industry. They should use Porter’s Five Forces framework and must be 
able to recognize structural differences in the industry along time. 
 Notice the vulnerability and so, the fast-changing nature of the travel industry 
during the period explored by the Teaching Case. They must be able to perceive the 
dot.com bubble as a huge shock on Priceline.com market value, as well as the impact of the 
post-dot.com bubble recession, the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the economical crisis 
started in 2008 in Priceline.com’s performance. 
 Understand the main strategic directions followed by the company, 
concerning acquisitions, internationalization and industry specialization, especially 
towards hotels and recently, car rentals. 
 Analyze Priceline.com strategy through the Dynamic Capabilities literature, 
particularly evaluating Priceline.com performance on each dimension of the view. 
TEACHING PLAN 
The teaching plan is divided into six main sections. The first section, Contributions, 
presents the body of knowledge that the case intends to offer. The second section, 
Accompanying Readings, refers to some useful supporting readings for a better 
contextualization of the case. The third section, Suggested Assignment Questions, is 
constituted from exploring questions which can extract a high-quality analysis from the 
case, in line with its teaching purpose. The fifth section, Suggested Answers, provides an 
approach for answers that students should follow, particularly mentioning the main topics 
to be understood and explored as well as timings required for responses. It should be 
noticed that there is not one single answer. The closing section, Lessons, refers to the 
principal conclusions from the case in relation to the literature of Dynamic Capabilities. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The present teaching case has the major purpose of contributing with practical evidence 
for the dynamic capabilities literature. In particular, the case intends to illustrate the 
success of a company within a fast-changing environment, subject of several shocks. 
According to the literature, dynamic capabilities are vital to address this high-velocity 
change. Each dimension that forms the new definition of dynamic capabilities will be 
analyzed in order to test the presence and the magnitude of dynamic capabilities 
Name your own change: the success history of Priceline.com 
36 
 
throughout the history of Priceline.com. As we explore the decisions taken by the firm we 
can assess the propensity of the company to sense opportunities and threats, to make 
timely and market oriented decisions and to change its resource base, as well as perceive 
how these dimensions relate among themselves. 
The ending contribution would be to support or reject the importance of each dimension 
for the successful performance of the company, as the literature suggests a link between 
dynamic capabilities and performance. 
ACCOMPANYING READINGS 
For the instructor to be better prepared, it would be useful a supporting reading about the 
dynamic capabilities’ theory. For this purpose I suggest “Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of 
Past Research and an Agenda for the Future,” (Ilídio Barreto, Journal of Management, 
January 2010). Students would also have benefit from other authors’ articles that 
contribute to the literature.  
Additional readings about the travel industry can be helpful, which can be obtained by the 
ITB World Travel Trend Report 2012/2013, created by IPK International. For a deeper 
understanding of the European travel industry I also recommend TOURISMlink Report, 
made available by the European Commission, in 2012.  
Finally, Priceline.com’s Annual Reports provide information in further detail about how 
the merchant model functioned for the different markets, as well as about strategic 
decisions and the financial reality. 
SUGGESTED ASSIGNEMET QUESTIONS 
1. Analyze the shocks that most affected the travel industry since 1998. (’25) 
2.  Identify the key strategic decisions taken by Priceline.com Inc. and analyze them 
according to the dynamic capabilities view. (25’) 
3. In your opinion, what are the changes occurred in the travel industry that presage 
major challenges for Priceline.com in the future?  (15’) 
SUGGESTED ANSWERS 
1. Analyze the shocks that most affected the travel industry (25’).  
Students must be able to recognize a large range of shocks with an emphasis for the 
economic, technological and behavioral shocks mentioned below (since they had a wider 
and more intense impact on the industry and so, they were further developed in the case). 
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Students should also refer the main important consequences derived from each shock, 
especially relating them with the travel demand.  
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2. Identify the most important shocks occurred between 2000 and 2002 and 
the key strategic decisions taken by Priceline.com afterwards. Analyze these 
decisions according to the dynamic capabilities view (25’). 
Recalling the emergent definition suggested by Barreto (2010), dynamic capabilities are 
the “firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resource base.” In the following table we can identify the most important shocks and the 
main strategic decisions taken, being analyzed according to the definition just described: 
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From the table above, we can identify the different dimensions of dynamic capabilities 
existent within the company, by identifying several actions taken by the firm in a way to 
solve problems, particularly arisen from these shocks. We can conclude that Priceline.com 
showed a high propensity for sensing opportunities and threats, for making market 
oriented decisions and for changing the resources base and a medium propensity to make 
decisions on a timely manner. Therefore, Priceline.com showed a high potential to solve 
the problems due to their dynamic capabilities.  
 
3. In your opinion, what are the major challenges and opportunities for 
Priceline.com in the future (15’)?  
This question is up to discussion, as there are multiple challenges and opportunities one 
can find in Priceline.com’s future path, some of them difficult to predict. Based on the case 
though, there are some challenges and opportunities which must gain further reflection: 
Potential Challenges 
One major challenge Priceline.com face is the potential rise of the importance of meta-
search engines, especially attributed to Google. In fact, Google is the leader in the global 
search engine market, although still lacking leadership in some countries like China. If 
meta-search engines gain importance in the industry, it will constitute another strong 
source of competition for Priceline.com. Moreover, this kind of competition can achieve 
different remarks: on the one hand, as search engines receive money per click instead of 
fees paid by suppliers, they can result in price reductions over bookings. As so, there is a 
strong possibility that customers, more sensitive to price than ever, quickly adopt this 
method to purchase travel services. On the other hand, suppliers can gain their power 
back, lowering fees paid to intermediaries or not even using the intermediaries’ service, 
which can make agencies very fragile.  
Second, the weight of Europe in the worldwide tourism has been decreasing. As 
Priceline.com’s revenues especially depend on this market, they can be affected by the 
trend. Moreover, the debt crisis has not seen its end yet, having the possibility to become 
more and more severe, which can augment its negative impact over the travel industry. 
Third, the market value of Priceline.com is, when compared with its competitors, high. 
Priceline.com must be able to sustain the investors’ confidence in their business, striving 
to maintain their growth rate trend. This can be particularly difficult to execute, as 
accomplishments have been extremely good for a long time now.    




Opposite to the increasing importance of the search engines, Priceline.com can take 
advantage of the customers’ adoption of mobile services, as smartphone and tablet 
penetration increases, as well as travel purchases through them. 
Emerging markets can signify a huge growth opportunity for Priceline.com Inc. since 
economic power is increasing there, which is a crucial factor for the growth of the tourism 
market. Moreover, online adoption rate in emerging markets is increasing. Priceline.com 
has still a high margin to grow in these markets, like China, where they did not achieve a 
solid position (yet).  
LESSONS 
The travel industry has suffered several kinds of shocks. The economic shocks had the 
highest impact on the industry, which includes the impact over Priceline.com. Social, 
technologic and political shocks also generated some shifts in the market. 
Priceline.com has shown a high propensity in regards to the four different dimensions, 
therefore the company has presented a high potential to systematically solve problems. 
The continuously change in the environment can generate either opportunities or threats 
for Priceline.com. The future geographical travel distribution and growth, allied with the 
importance of search engines and mobiles as travel services providers are important 














The objective of this section is to provide a relation between the literature review 
developed on dynamic capabilities (DCs) and the real life business history presented with 
the teaching case. I will particularly focus my analysis on the new definition of dynamic 
capabilities and on previous studies which link dynamic capabilities to performance, being 
my intention to find evidence that supports the literature or not. I do not intend, however, 
to conclude on the proof or rejection of the theory based on one single real case, but to 
contribute for the pool of evidence that, as a whole, can do it. Furthermore, I will briefly 
discuss over some limitations still existent on the literature. 
The business history is about Priceline.com. This company operates in a fast changing 
environment, which is an important condition for the analysis since the literature on DCs 
is especially distinctive from previous theories (Porter’s Five Forces and the Resource 
Base Theory) because it is able to address a dynamic context (Teece, 2007). In fact, the 
travel industry is highly vulnerable to an enormous variety of shocks such as economic 
(e.g. dot-com bubble, post-bubble recession, oil price variations, the debt crisis of 2008, 
growing economic power of emerging countries),  technological (e.g. launch of 
smartphones and tablets); behavioral (e.g. penetration of internet use, penetration of 
mobile bookings) or several other influent periodic events such as diseases (e.g. SARS), 
natural disasters (e.g. Japanese hurricane), terrorist attacks (e.g. 9/11 in United States) 
and wars (e.g. Iraq). Besides, the industry has low barriers to entry, which implies 
constant competitive threats for existing players.  
Does Priceline.com possess dynamic capabilities to deal with those shocks? Recalling the 
emergent definition suggested by Barreto (2010, p. 271), dynamic capabilities are the 
“firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resource base.” These four mentioned dimensions are related among them in an aggregate 
multidimensional construct. It is an aggregate construct because it is formed by the 
dimensions rather than being manifested into the dimensions (Law et al., 1998).  
Starting with the propensity to sense opportunities and threats, we can perceive that the 
primary opportunity discovered by Priceline.com was the creation of the company itself as 
pioneer of the “Name Your Own Price” model. Behind the opportunity, there was a 
technological and a behavioral shock: the development and adoption of the internet. 
Priceline.com replicated the new kind of auction, firstly created for airline tickets, to a 
wide range of different products. Some of which revealed to be important for 
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Priceline.com’s success (such as the hotel reservation or the car rental service), some 
other were negative for their performance (like in groceries and gas).  
Priceline.com was also able to sense opportunities and threats that especially emerged 
from some of the most important exogenous shocks, during the early years of operations: 
the dot-com bubble, its respective dot-com bubble recession and the terrorist attack on 
9th September 2001. They have generated a reduction on the demand for flights, which 
cause airlines downsize the offer and diminish prices for airline tickets. The travel 
industry was negatively affected as a whole, suffering a further structural and functional 
modification with the creation of Orbitz, by major U.S. airlines. 
Having their environment severely changed and their performance affected, Priceline.com 
searched for solutions. Even though the U.S. airline market was becoming less attractive, 
there was still a large amount of opportunities in the travel industry to be explored. 
Priceline.com was able to perceive hotel bookings as an area where they should invest. 
Additionally, the company sensed the opportunity of growing internationally, particularly 
in Europe and Asia-Pacific. Both regions were an opportunity in terms of market size, 
growth and nature. The company was also able to perceive that, even though the company 
was the originator of a business model with a vast potential, they were just capturing a 
niche of the market consisting of consumers who were more flexible. As so, Priceline.com 
considered the opportunity of enlarging the choice of customers using the traditional 
model, the one that other agencies also used. Considering the shock of Google’s entry as a 
direct competitor, Priceline.com was able to sense the threat and reacted to it. 
It can be easily perceived that these new markets (hotel reservations, new regions and the 
search engine) or the traditional model were there “waiting to be discovered” (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007). Priceline.com just had to notice the opportunity, not to search for it, or 
even just decide to invest towards those directions (decision making dimension). 
The opportunities I mentioned above were the ones which actually materialized into 
actions, passing from a phase of decision making. There are two decision making 
dimensions comprised in the definition: one covers the time of the decision making 
whereas the other covers its market orientation, which is mainly given by the actual value 
perceived by customers (Priem, 2007). 
As we could perceive throughout the case, Priceline.com had a first mover advantage with 
their NYOP model. When the company started to offer services under the agency model, 
which resulted in their major source of profits, the traditional model was already being 
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used by all their competitors; therefore Priceline.com was a late player. Regarding 
internationalization, the European hotel reservation market had already important local 
players, including the major U.S. OTAs, such Expedia and Travelocity. The same held true 
when they entered in the Asia Pacific market. However, the investment of Priceline.com 
still meant a time-to-market decision, since the context was one of growth in both regions.  
As a meta-search engine provider, Priceline.com lacked the desirable timing since Google 
was the global search engine leader, not giving much space for competition.  In several 
other operational decisions, Priceline.com was timely effective, such as in the offer of 
mobile services, as they responded in a timely manner to customers’ demand. 
Consequently, though the potential for making timely decisions existed and was important 
in some crucial moments, it was not so evident in others, which can compromise 
Priceline.com’s future. 
The propensity to make market oriented decisions was high and clear across 
Priceline.com’s history, as the company has continuously delivered important value to 
their customers. On the one hand, the investment on the hotel reservations revealed to be 
market oriented. On the other hand, they revealed to be extremely focused on customers’ 
needs in all their segments, as their decisions on marketing, website design, prices and 
range of supply, among others, show). 
Last but not the least, the company has shown a high propensity to change their resources 
base, which is worth to be explored using the GAP model (Teng, 2007). According to the 
GAP model, when a company set a specific strategy lacking the resources to achieve it, 
there is a gap of resources that must be fulfilled. The company opted to obtain those 
resources outside, through acquisitions. The main advantage of these acquisitions was 
enabling Priceline.com Inc. to grow rapidly, which is important in a hypercompetitive 
environment (D’Aveni, 1994). However, according to the literature, acquisitions could 
have brought some difficulties, especially at firm’s integration level. Maybe for that reason, 
Priceline.com Inc. opted to have larger costs in maintaining the independence of 
companies. The only exception occurred with the merger between Active Hotels and 
Booking.com, which operated in the same business and in the same geographical market 
(Europe). Similarities between companies can suggest less integration problems. The 
acquisition strategy has been used several times across Priceline.com Inc.’s history: Active 
Hotels, Booking.com, Agoda, Rentalcars.com and Kayak were the most important acquired 
companies.  Resources were constantly changing if considering the expansion of the width 
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of supply in one region too. Partnerships made by Priceline.com can also be considered as 
an alternative to achieve resources, although giving only a temporary access to them.  
Overall, after important shocks Priceline.com has shown a high propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, a medium propensity to make timely decisions, a high 
propensity to make market oriented decisions and a high propensity to change their 
resource base. Summing up, the mentioned propensity for the four dimensions converges 
to the firm’s high potential to systematically solve problems within a fast-changing 
environment.  
However, the propensity regarding these dimensions was not so evident in the early years, 
before Jeffery Boyd’s role as CEO, which can be related with a lower performance by the 
firm during this period. Later, the case though showed a link between the existence of 
dynamic capabilities and the good performance of Priceline.com. In fact, the company has 
continuously and exponentially increased their revenues, gross profits, net income and 
market capitalization, even during a severe crisis. The only year when net profits 
decreased was 2008 but the economic recession did not affect Priceline.com Inc.’s 
business as the post-bubble recession did, proving that the company has created some 
mechanisms against the negative economic impact on the industry 
Following Teece et al.’s (2007) belief, Priceline.com’s DCs were decisive to address the fast 
changing environment where the company operated. Nevertheless, there was no evidence 
that the aim of DCs was extended to the effective creation of market change, defended by 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). 
Moreover, the case demonstrated a positive relation among dimensions. However, making 
timely and market oriented decisions can be complementary (such as in the case of the 
internationalization to the European hotel reservations market) or opposing (such as in 
the case of the groceries and gas investment, as they launched the service soon but they 
lacked market orientation). 
Furthermore, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) stated the existence of idiosyncratic details 
beyond the common features of DCs across firms. They defended that one specific dynamic 
capability could be derived from multiple paths and that DCs can produce differentiated 
performance levels. We can verify this throughout the case, if comparing Priceline.com and 
their competitors’ decisions. For example, Hotels was the subsidiary chosen from Expedia 
to compete in the European hotel reservation market, but contrary to Booking.com, this 
Name your own change: the success history of Priceline.com 
45 
 
acquisition was not originated in Europe. Both companies were market-oriented despite 
the difference in this important detail. Their performance was different too. 
Adding to the contributions, the case also encloses some limitations. The literature still 
lacks precision on defining the concept of the timely decision making. If we know that 
market oriented decisions are those who create value for customers, particularly through 
the design and performance of the product or business model, we are not able to define 
what is to make timely decisions. Sometimes, companies benefit as first movers, 
sometimes they benefit from avoiding the problems that first movers went through. 
Decisions should not be taken too soon or too late, but what determines the correct 
moment? The theoretical development of this dimension would be useful to better 
understand success and to be applicable on real-life situations. 
Other limitation is the extent to which the case represents a contribution to the literature.  
It must be reminded that this case should be complemented with other real world 






















The Dynamic Capabilities View strives to provide insights on how a company can 
accomplish competitive advantages on fast-changing environments. However, this View 
refers to the pursuit of temporary competitive advantages instead of sustainable 
competitive advantages considered in previous theories. Companies which present a 
higher adaptation capacity to change will be more able to succeed. 
The literature of Dynamic Capabilities that has been developed by several researchers 
revealed to be important for managerial decisions but provided though some margin for 
improvement and solidification, which Barreto (2010) tried to fill when suggesting a new 
definition for DCs. The new definition encompasses the objective of being non-tautological, 
on the one hand, and operationalizable, on the other. 
The mentioned literature was particularly analyzed through a teaching case.  The case 
involves Priceline.com’s story, having for scenario the travel industry, which is strongly 
and constantly affected by different shocks. Priceline.com moved from a trembling 
performance in the early years to become one of the leaders within the travel industry. 
The company has shown that they owned dynamic capabilities and, in consequence, the 
capacity to attain growth and success. As a matter of fact, Priceline.com has presented a 
high capacity for sensing opportunities and threats, for making market-oriented decisions 
and for changing its resource base, while showing a medium capacity to make timely 
decisions. Thus, the company has been vigorous in the four dimensions of the Dynamic 
Capabilities view. 
Concluding, the case contributed for the literature with important elements about DCs and 
provided additional evidence for the relevance of the Dynamic Capabilities View. This 
View is extremely important as, beyond research purposes, it has a crucial role on the 










Exhibit 1: Intra-European air services (take-offs from UE27, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland) 
 
Source: The geography of European low-cost airline networks: a contemporary analysis, Journal of Transport 
Geography, 2013, Vol. 28, p.  
Exhibit 2: Main means of transport for European tourists 
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Exhibit 3: Stock Market Capitalization of main U.S. OTAs 
 
Source: Bloomberg, 2013 
*Main U.S. OTAs include Travelociy which is not a public company. 
 
Exhibit 4 – International tourist arrivals variation, 2006-2009 
 
Source: UNWTO, 2011 
 
 
Exhibit 5 – International tourist arrivals 
 
 




1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Priceline.com 7763, 231,5 1303, 359,5 673,2 916,7 941,8 1596, 4418, 3018, 9955, 19636 23291 30939 34955 
Expedia             3916, 3270, 4224, 1111, 3503, 6873, 3876, 8314, 8342, 
Orbitz                 706,4 323,4 615,3 572,1 390,3 285,9 681,1 
TripAdvisor                         3364, 5988, 6985, 
7763,2 
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Exhibit 6: GDP Growth, 1998-2011
 
Source: World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) © 
*GDP data are in current $US and euro (based on the average annual exchangerate for euro or ECU to $US) and 
can be strongly influenced by exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
Exhibit 7: Impact on global tourism, 1996 -2009
 
Exhibit 8: Tourism Revenues 
 
Source: World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) © 
*Revenus data are in current $US and euro (based on the average annual exchangerate for euro or ECU to $US) 
and can be strongly influenced by exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World 2,3 3,3 4,2 1,7 2,0 2,7 4,0 3,5 4,0 3,9 1,3 -2,2 4,4 2,7 
European Area 2,9 3,0 3,9 2,1 1,3 1,5 2,5 2,1 3,3 3,2 0,3 -4,3 2,2 1,5 
North America 4,4 4,9 4,2 1,1 1,9 2,5 3,5 3,1 2,7 1,9 -0,3 -3,5 3,0 1,8 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) -1,1 2,3 4,2 1,9 2,9 3,7 4,6 4,1 4,8 5,7 2,5 -0,3 6,7 3,4 





















GDP Growth (%)* 1998-2011 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World 530,3 554,0 572,4 563,2 589,9 647,8 771,2 831,7 903,1 1042,1 1148,6 1030,6 1120,1 1256,2 
European Area 230,4 240,0 235,4 232,6 246,7 286,0 332,6 350,2 380,8 434,2 465,6 401,7 400,0 453,5 
North America 116,6 124,0 134,4 122,1 117,5 114,1 131,3 143,2 150,3 167,0 188,7 165,4 183,9 206,3 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 78,3 86,7 93,4 95,6 105,0 106,2 138,7 149,0 164,6 197,3 218,9 208,4 255,9 291,0 




















World and Regional tourism revenues ($bn) 
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Exhibit 9: Tourism Revenues Growth
 
Source: World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) © 
*Revenues data are in current $US and euro (based on the average annual exchangerate for euro or ECU to 
$US) and can be strongly influenced by exchange rate fluctuations. 
  




Exhibit 11: U.S. GAAP EBITDA of U.S. main OTAs 
 
Source: Bloomberg, 2013 
*values disclosed only for public traded companies.In 2002, Sabre acquired owned Travelocity, which was acquired later by 
TPG Capital and Silver Lake Partners. Expedia was owned by multiple firms nad Orbitz was owned by Cedant. 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World 0,6% 4,5% 3,3% -1,6% 4,7% 9,8% 19,1% 7,8% 8,6% 15,4% 10,2% -10,3% 8,7% 12,1%
European Area 5,8% 4,2% -2,0% -1,2% 6,0% 15,9% 16,3% 5,3% 8,7% 14,0% 7,3% -13,7% -0,4% 13,4%
North America -1,1% 6,3% 8,4% -9,1% -3,8% -2,9% 15,0% 9,1% 4,9% 11,1% 13,0% -12,3% 11,2% 12,1%
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) -12,6% 10,8% 7,7% 2,4% 9,8% 1,1% 30,6% 7,4% 10,5% 19,8% 10,9% -4,8% 22,8% 13,7%
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Exhibit 12: Market Share among Top Five Pan-European OTAs 
  
Source: PhoCusWright, 2011 
 
Exhibit 12: Online Travel Penetration, 2008-2012 
 
Source: PhoCusWright, 2011 
 
Exhibit 13: Origin areas for European tourism, 2009 
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Exhibit 14: EU eTourism market shares, 2012 
 
Source: PhoCusWright, 2011 
 
Exhibit 15: Cruises growth, 2004-2011 
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